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Abstract 
 
Technology spillover induced by foreign direct investment has been proved to be an 
important channel to boost the productivity growth of local firms in the host country, 
especially in the context of developing economies. However, the empirical evidence 
remains inconsistent as to what extent the scale of spillover is affected by the 
productivity gap between foreign investors and local firms. This paper attempts to 
make clear such mechanism by applying Vietnamese firm-level data. Focusing on 
Asian investors, we show that the relationship between the productivity gap and 
vertical spillover takes an inverted-U shape. To be specific, we use stepwise chow test 
to decide on the cutoff value of total factor productivity (TFP) as the grouping criteria, 
and divide investors into low, middle and high-TFP groups. The results reveal that 
local suppliers in Vietnam can benefit the most from the Asian investors with 
middle-level TFP, whereas the benefits from the other two groups fade away. The 
finding is strongly robust even after we control the other spillover-influential factors 
such as firms' own effort to innovate, foreign firms' ownership, country and industry 
heterogeneity, and no matter whether we use stochastic frontier or Levinsohn & Petrin 
measurement of TFP. It thus provides novel evidence that investors with advanced 
technology do not necessarily diffuse their know-how to local partners. This implies it 
is important that both Vietnamese local firms and investors with superior technology 
work in the same direction to stimulate more corporations with each other.  
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1 Introduction
Empirical studies to explore the relationship between the technology gap and spillover
at the macro-level show contradictory results. Li and Liu (2005), discover that a higher-
technology gap (measured as per capita income ratio) between the domestic economy and
the technology leader reduces the positive eect from FDI on income growth. However,
Baltabaev (2014) indicates that technology gap can enhance the spillover from FDI. This
has been supported by Shen et al. (2010) who nd that high income levels promote the
positive impact of FDI. In the meantime, micro-level studies also yield mixed ndings. Liu
et al. (2000), for example, nd a negative signicant impact from the technology gap in the
UK manufacturing industry. Blalock and Gertler (2009), on the other hand, demonstrate
that Indonesian manufacturing rms with larger technological gaps gain from FDI. They
also show that rms with greater absorptive capacity benet more from downstream FDI,
implying the necessity to control rms' own absorbing eort.
Based on previous literature, this study takes a step further to measure the spillover
impact from foreign investors by controlling the level of technology gap. To be specic, we
group foreign rms by the TFP level while taking into account their geographical hetero-
geneity and ownership dierence. We use dierent thresholds as grouping criteria and divide
investors into low-, middle- and high-TFP ones. We pay special attention to the vertical
linkage because it is most likely to occur (Blalock and Gertler, 2008). However, to take
into account the possible inuence from the foreign competitors in the same industry, we
include horizontal spillover index in the estimation as well. After controlling rms' own ef-
fort to absorb technology and other rm-industry-year xed eects, we show a robust result
that local suppliers in Vietnam experience the most productivity gains in the presence of
downstream Asian partners who have relatively similar TFP as the suppliers themselves, or
in other words, the \peers". It is thus in contrast with some of the existing studies which
indicate that only a larger technology gap between upstream local rms and downstream
foreign investors will lead to greater spillover (Findlay, 1978; Wang and Blomstrom, 1992;
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Borensztein et al., 1998).
This study is positioned as the rst paper to apply rm-level data to verify how the level
of technology gap matters for spillover realization in the context of Vietnam. This paper
contributes to the previous literature by empirically presenting the consistent and robust
result to make clear the relationship. The rest of the paper will be organized as follows:
Section 2 describes the situation of inward FDI in Vietnam and why it is important to
investigate this issue in Vietnam. Section 3 summarizes the previous literature concerning
the technology gap and spillover eect of FDI. Section 4 describes the data and estimation
strategy. Section 5 presents the results, and examines the robustness. Section 6 concludes.
2 Foreign direct investment in Vietnam
Vietnam is an ideal setting for us to investigate the relationship between FDI and tech-
nology spillover, for several reasons. To begin with, Vietnam has experienced remarkable
economic growth mainly due to two major events|the adoption of a major economic reform
called Doi Moi in 1986, and the accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2006.
According to the \Vietnam country prole" made by Library of Congress Federal Research
Division, a high growth rate of around 7% was observed from the late 1990s, and this period
is characterized as being a period of rapid increase in inward FDI to the country (see Figure
3-2). By year 2000, China had been the world ?s most popular destination for FDI for a
long time, however, ever since then, the trend has shifted to emerging South-East Asian
countries, among which Vietnam is becoming one of the most successful countries in the
region in attracting FDI across the world both because of its labor abundance and low wage
rate1 and the success of Doi Moi in liberalizing trade and investment.
In the meantime, for most of the foreign investors who are entering the Vietnamese
1For example, in the apparel industry, the average wage in Vietnam is approximately half that in China
(the Wall Street Journal, May 1st, 2013). Also, Samsung is shifting their production base to Vietnam in
order to maintain prot margins by saving labor costs as growth in sales of high-end handsets has slowed
down, according to a Bloomberg report in December 2013 (Lee and Folkmanis, 2013).
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Figure 1: Number of FDI projects and implemented FDI (Bill. Dongs) in Vietnam.
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market, they have far better technology than their Vietnamese counterparts do, in term
of TFP. Ni et al. (2015) has shown that the average TFP levels of Asian, European and
North American rms are all higher than that of the Vietnamese rms (See Figure 2), and
such technology disadvantage gives Vietnamese rms more potential to catch up. Since
technology spillover from foreign investors turns out to be an important channel to boost
the productivity of domestic rms in Vietnam (Nguyen, 2008), Vietnamese government
has committed to improve its investment environment and tries to use more policy tools2
to attract FDI. However, the targets are not limited to foreign investors with advanced
technology. For instance, the newly passed 2005 Investment law in Vietnam distinguishes the
sectors in which FDI is encouraged, including both labor-intensive and high-tech industries.
Such actions increase the uncertainty as what kind of FDI will enter and lead to random
technology gap between new foreign investors and domestic rms, which leaves room for us
to explore how the spillover can be aected by technology dierences. The ndings can thus
provide possible implications for the decision-makers in Vietnam to adjust further policies.
2Policies' inuence on the technology spillover might also be substantial, it is beyond the scope of
discussion in this paper.
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Figure 2: Average rm TFP by region.
Source: Ni et al. (2015).  
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3 Conceptual framework and literature review
To investigate how the productivity gap can aect the level of technology spillover that
local suppliers receive, there are several questions that need to be answered: How can tech-
nology spillover be measured, and how is it determined? In terms of vertical spillover, why
does the technology gap matter?
The technology spillover eect has always been a noticeable topic regarding the impact of
FDI3. The prevailing perception of such eect has been based on domestic rms' productivity,
and in empirical works mixed results have been observed concerning the spillover eect, as
in the survey of Smeets (2008). However, the phenomenon might be induced by factors such
as the channels for transferring technology via FDI and local rms' capabilities to absorb
the knowledge. With regard to the former, as suggested in Saggi (2002), there are three
potential channels of spillover: demonstration eect, labor switching and vertical linkage.
1. Demonstration eect. Local rms may imitate multinational rms (MNEs) because
3Rigorously speaking, we are dening the technology spillover as the knowledge transmission between
rms with dierent ownership, in comparison to the one that occurs in between a rm's headquarter and its
oversea subsidiaries. In Saggi (2002), spillover alone has been dened as the pure externalities accompanying
FDI, such as facilitation of technology adoption.
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it is too costly to adopt the new technology owned by MNEs. Through this process, the set
of technologies available to local rms can be expanded, leading to a positive externality.
But in the meantime, the incremental technologies may also increase the competition. If
the competition eect outweighs the positive inuence, the total net eect of the technology
spillover due to FDI will turn out to be negative, which is known as the \crowding out" or
\market stealing eect" (Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Caves, 1996; Sleuwaegen and Backer,
2003). This eect is observed mostly in the same industry where competition is more common
and addressed as \horizontal spillover".
2. Labor switching. The knowledge embodied by the workers can transmit across rms
through physical movement. Those who have worked in multinational rms will bring the
knowledge to the next employer, and such intangible asset can also become a source of
technology spillover. However, since it is dicult to track the individuals' carry-on from old
to new employers and we focus mainly on the spillover eect derived from rms' interaction,
we will not emphasize on this factor in the current study.
3. Vertical linkage. This is the most widely recognized channel through which the tech-
nology spillover might occur. During the process when foreign investors in the downstream
industries source from the local suppliers in the upstream industries, the know-how as well as
the demanding requirements by foreign rms will push up the productivity level of the sup-
pliers, resulting in the backward vertical spillover. Evidence of technology transfer through
vertical linkage is well observed. For example, Blomstrom and Kokko (1998), Gorg and
Greenaway (2004) all nd positive vertical spillover. Javorcik (2004) comes up with similar
results in Lithuania. Recent literature to support the positive spillover argument includes
Blalock and Gertler (2008), Indonesia/ Javorcik and Li (2013), Romania. Combining the
three factors together, since vertical linkage is most likely to benet local rms, it will be of
the utmost interest in our study.
For the spillover to take eect, apart from the supply side of technology as mentioned
above, we also need to look into the demand side catered for the technology upgrading.
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That is, if a local supplier wants to benet from the advanced technology owned by foreign
investors, there are two major determinants: the supplier's own eort to innovate, such as
the proportion of expenditure on R&D to the total revenue, and its compatibility to absorb
the technology, or the \capability to catch up". Especially for the latter, it to a great extent
determines the diusion level a local rm might receive and has been explored by a number
of previous studies. Carluccio and Fally (2013) provide a decent theoretical explanation
on the mechanism of how compatibility aects technology spillover: The more compatible a
supplier is to adopt the foreign technology, the wider the choice set of compatible intermediate
inputs will be, thus reducing the production unit cost and driving up the productivity of the
supplier. Such variation becomes the source of dierence in technology spillover eect. More
practically, technology gap is used to capture the incompatibility between local suppliers
and foreign investors in the downstream industries. Findlay (1978), Wang and Blomstrom
(1992), Borensztein et al. (1998) all theoretically show that larger technology gap is related
to more vertical spillover. Nevertheless, the empirical research trying to investigate this
issue is rarely seen. Although several studies are aimed at quantifying the inuence the
technology gap might have on the spillover level4, none of them take into the account the
vertical interaction across industries. Le and Pomfret (2010) is the most similar to our
study in the sense that they consider both vertical spillover and technology (measured by
labor productivity) gap, but the result is inconclusive. Also, since the \technology gap"
term enters the model separately from the spillover index, the assumption is that these two
variables will have a linear correlation, while this might not always be correct (Perez, 1997).
In this study, we would like to relax the above assumption and take a dierent approach
by studying how foreign investors with dierent TFP levels aect the spillover they might
4In the macro level, Baltabaev (2014) shows technology gap is positively associated with TFP growth
whereas Lai et al. (2009) use Chinese provincial data to present a non-linear relationship between the
technology gap and spillover level. As for micro-level evidence, Liu et al. (2000) use UK data to show that
after controlling rms' own stock of indigenous knowledge (intangible assets per worker in locally-owned
rms to those in foreign-owned rm), technology gap (value added per employee in a foreign rm/local
rm in each industry) is found to be negatively correlated with the labor productivity of local rms in the
same industry. In contrast, Blalock and Gertler (2009) apply Indonesian data and indicate that within the
industry, the larger the technology gap, the more productivity gain local rms will receive.
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induce to the Vietnamese suppliers located in the upstream industries. We will group foreign
investors based on dierent thresholds of ex ante productivity level and see how each group
promotes the local suppliers' TFP. The detailed methodology will be described in the next
section.
4 Data and estimation strategy
4.1 Data
This paper uses a panel dataset constructed from the Vietnam Enterprise Survey at rm
level. The Vietnam Enterprise Survey data is collected annually by the General Statistics
Oce (GSO) of Vietnam for all industrial sectors as of March 1st of each year. The general
objectives of this survey are: (i) to collect the business information needed to compile national
accounts; (ii) to gather up-to-date information on business registrations; and (iii) to develop
a statistical database of enterprises. This panel dataset covers ten years, from 2002 to
2011, in which Vietnam experienced two major economic changes, namely WTO accession
and the global economic crisis. The majority of the rms in the dataset can be found
in the list of Vietnam Standard Industrial Classication (VSIC) codes5, including all 22
manufacturing sectors out of 42 in total. Proles of rms concerning ownership, labor, capital
stock, turnover, assets, FDI, wage, materials inputs and other information are provided6. In
our estimation model, we measure capital and labor by xed asset and total labor at the end
of year. Output and capital are deated using annual GDP7. Above that, the GSO surveyed
all multinational enterprises (MNEs), which are dened as rms that have foreign capital8.
An advantage of this dataset is that the country that represents the ownership of the rm is
5We use the rst 2-digits indicated in VSICcode2007 and VSICcode1993 to identify industries. For
simplicity we aggregate some sectors. The details are available upon request.
6Census is taken for rms with more than 10 employees (over 20 employees in 2010 and 2011).
7Producer Price Index in the sector level is a preferred deator but such data are not available for
Vietnam.
8The sampling methods varied for private rms across years.
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also reported9. Each rm is given a unique \enterprise code", and it is used together with
the province code to identify rms and construct the panel dataset.
To achieve more accurate estimation results, we eliminate the missing observations and
outliers. Firms in the top and bottom one percentile of all rm-specic output and input
variables (in the means of annual growth) were deleted from the sample. Also the top and
bottom 1% of output/capital and output/labor are excluded.
4.2 Estimating the rm productivity
TFP is the most commonly used measure of the eect of FDI spillover on a rm's perfor-
mance in the literature (see, for example, Javorcik 2004). Although there are many ways to
estimate TFP, we choose two alternative approaches that are suitable to our data situation,
namely stochastic frontier estimation, and Levingsohn and Petrin's (2003) rm-level produc-
tivity estimation. The former has the advantage of isolating statistical noise from genuine
productivity whereas the latter has the advantage of incorporating explicitly the correlation
between unobservable productivity shocks and input levels.
Let us begin by using the traditional econometric approach to estimate TFP to illustrate
the advantages of our approaches. The Cobb-Douglas production function is written as:
lnYit =  + klnKit + llnLit + "it (1)
where Yit stands for rm i's net revenue in year t. K and L represent capital and labor
respectively, "it is the unobserved error term. Once this model is estimated using ordinary
least squares (OLS), TFP is calculated by normalizing the exponential transformation of
the residual10. The well-known drawback of this approach is its inability to isolate genuine
productivity from statistical noise.
9We only count the foreign ownership with the largest share. For example, if Japan's share of investment
is the largest, we consider the rm to be a Japanese-invested rm.
10The intercept is usually corrected make the estimated TFP to fall within the appropriate range.
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The stochastic frontier analysis overcomes this drawback by including two error compo-
nents representing both (the inverse) technical eciency and statistical noise. According to
Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000), the model is specied as:
lnYit = 0 +
X
nlnxni + vi + ui (2)
where xni is a vector of inputs. vi is the noise component and ui is the nonnegative tech-
nical ineciency component. Here, technical eciency derived by inverting the technical
ineciency estimate is the measure of TFP. A half normal, exponential and Gamma distri-
butions are often assumed on ui to ensure non-negativity of productivity estimates whereas
a full normal distribution is assumed on vi as is common for random noise. The conditions
for the error components for the normal-half normal model are: (i) vi  iid N(0; v2) (ii)
ui  iid N+(0; v2) (iii) vi and ui are distributed independently of each other, and of the
regressors.
This model is estimated by maximum likelihood estimation. Once estimates of ui are
obtained from the residual of the model, the technical eciency of the rm can be obtained
by:
TEi = expf u^ig (3)
where u^i is E(ui j "i) 11. Alternative distributional assumptions on ui can be accommodated
simply by replacing (ii).
Meanwhile, the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method tries to alleviate the bias caused
by correlation between unobservable productivity shocks and input levels. The detailed
discussion can be found in Ni et al. (2015). When the method is applied, however, the
lack of data on intermediate input, is a critical constraint for us. We do not have a direct
measure of intermediate input, instead, we use? work-in-process?as a proxy variable for
11E(ui j "i) = i +  ( 

i =
)
1 ( i =) = 
[ ("i=)1 ("i=)   "i ],  and  are u and v ;  and  are density
and cumulative density functions respectively.
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intermediate input.?Work-in-process?is an appropriate proxy because products that are
uncompleted in the previous period are to be brought into the production line in the current
period and to be completed. Also, it has to be noted that we interpolate input variables
to avoid losing too many observations due to the use of the lagged inputs in the Levinsohn
and Petrin model. These caveats are thought to reduce reliability of our estimation using
this structural approach. Thus, we rather use this model as a supplementary tool for the
stochastic frontier analysis.
4.3 Estimating the spillover eect
Now we proceed to the methodology to estimate the eect of FDI on the estimated TFP.
A standard reduced form is used where a rm' s TFP is regressed on measures of the FDI
spillover and other covariates, as in Javorcik and Spatareanu (2011). The FDI spillover
variables are built based on the inuence of FDI within the same industry and downstream
industries. Since Ni et al. (2015) have shown that only investors from Asian regions tend to
induce signicant spillover eect, we will focus on Asian investors' impact while controlling
for investors from other major areas12. The estimation model becomes:
lnTFPit = Horizontal Groupjt 1 + V ertical Groupjt 1 +Herfindaljt 1
+i +Xit + t + uit (4)
where the variable V ertical Group is dened as:
V ertical Groupjt =
X
k 6=j
jktHorizontal Groupkt (5)
lnTFPit is the logarithm of TFP of a local rm i, at time t. Following the formula
12Another advantage is that the geographical heterogeneity which might aect the spillover level can also
be ignored. However, for the robustness check, we also conduct the analysis to include the factor of country
of origin, and the results remain unchanged
10
developed by Javorcik and Spatareanu (2011), we dene Horizontal Group as the share of
the output produced by foreign rms within sector k in year t, and jkt is the coecient
representing the proportion of sector j ?s output used by sector k in year t13. All the coef-
cients are taken from the Vietnamese Input-Output Table (IO Table) 2007. The \Group"
term attached to each spillover variable depends on how we group foreign investors. Since we
focus on how the productivity dierence for Asian investors matters, we will choose dierent
TFP threshold \'" to divide Asian investors into subgroups. Thus the above equation can
be rewritten as:
lnTFPit = Horizontal Groupjt 1 +
PX
'=1
V ertical Asia'jt 1 + V ertical Europejt 1
+V ertical NorthAmericajt 1 +Herfindaljt 1 + i +Xit + t + uit (6)
where P stands for the number of thresholds we use. The potential spillover induced by
European and North American investors are also included14. Since there might be a time
lag for spillover to occur, we use the one-year lags of each variable as independent variables.
Xit represents rm covariates. In particular, we need to control a local rm's own eort
to absorb the technology, which is calculated as R&D expenditure/Net turnover. We also
include the industry-level Herndahl index. Firm xed eect i and year dummy t are
being controlled.
For the industry classication, we follow that of the IO Table 2007 because we need to
explore the industry linkage to construct vertical spillover variables. However, because the
Enterprise Survey follows VSICcode industry classication, we had to match the industries
in the dataset with those used in the IO Table. In the end, our industry categories reduced
from 138 to 42 (Half of them are manufacturing sectors). Furthermore, the VSICcode system
changed from VSICcode1993 to VSICcode2007 in year 2007, and therefore, the industry codes
13When we calculate jkt, sector j ?s output sold for nal consumption was excluded.
14Since investors from Asia, Europe and North America occupy more than 90% of the observations in the
dataset, we ignore the inuence of investors from other regions for the time being.
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used in prior to 2007 are converted in accordance with VSICcode2007 by using a 1993-2007
concordance table15.
4.4 Grouping the Asian investors
When it comes to the grouping of the Asian investors, we need to choose the TFP
thresholds that might cause the structual change of the inuence that the investors might
have on the spillover level. In order to determine such thresholds, statistical tests have to
be conducted and we adopt a modied Stepwise Chow Test16. The idea is that suppose we
have a baseline estimation model:
yt = 0 + 1V ertical Asia+ ut (7)
We want to verify that apart from the total vertical spillover, whether there is substantial
change if we include an additional term which reects the partial inuence of Asian investors.
We then run an augmented model:
yt = 0 + 1V ertical Asia+ 'V ertical Asia
' + ut (8)
where we use the sum of squared residuals from equations (8) and (7) to test the null
hypothesis H0 : '. The F statistics are calculated as follows:
F =
SSR1   SSR2
SSR1
 N   k
q
(9)
q is the number of restrictions and k is the number of parameters. We replace the term
V ertical Asia' each time we change the value of '. In practice, we will use percentiles of
the ' distribution among Asian investors and start from the lowest (i.e. from 1% cuto
to 100% cuto). The purpose is to nd out the largest F statistics and determine the
15The table is made based on the content description of the sector.
16We made reference to Lai et al. (2009).
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correspondent '. The result of the test is illustrated in Figure 2.
Figure 3: Chow F statistics by TFP percentage (Asian).
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As we can see, at the 80% cuto there is a huge spike, which indicates the potential
structural change starting from this value. At the 35% another spike is observed, but less
steeper. Thus we rst use 80% TFP cuto as our main criteria, and divide Asian investors
into \>80%" and \<80%" groups. Then we need to construct the vertical Asian spillover
indexes based on the observations within each range respectively. In the next attempt, we
will use the 35% cuto to further divide \<80%" group into lower and middle subgroups.
Both estimation results will be shown in the following section.
5 Estimation results
5.1 Results for using 80% TFP cuto
The baseline estimation results using equation (6) are shown in Table 1. We observe
negative signs for Horizontal Group throughout the models, and this indicates the presence
of a strong replacement eect by investors in the same industry. As for the variable of
interest|vertical Asia, only the one that is constructed using the \<80%" group of samples
13
Table 1: Baseline grouping (80% TFP cuto)
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Stochastic  Frontier 
Dependent Variable LnTFP LnTFP LnTFP LnTFP 
Horizontal_total (lag 1) -0.0425***   -0.0136   
  (0.00804)   (0.00843)   
Vertical_Asia (lag 1) (>80%) 0.00937* 0.0127** -0.00173 -0.00390 
  (0.00477) (0.00501) (0.0183) (0.0195) 
Vertical_Asia (lag 1) (<80%) 0.0330*** 0.0277*** 0.0370*** 0.0371*** 
  (0.00873) (0.00819) (0.00957) (0.00991) 
Vertical_Europe (lag1) -0.149* -0.116 -0.0123 -0.0283 
  (0.0896) (0.0876) (0.104) (0.106) 
Vertical_NorthAme (lag1) 0.338 0.332 -0.151 -0.0426 
 (0.338) (0.337) (0.321) (0.339) 
Own_effort -8.09e-05 -0.000105 -7.37e-06** -7.32e-06** 
  (0.000142) (0.000148) (3.50e-06) (3.59e-06) 
Herfindal Index 0.224** 0.269*** -0.139 -0.0271 
  (0.0912) (0.0980) (0.145) (0.125) 
Observations 421,438 420,810 421,535 420,908 
R-squared 0.044 0.044 0.055 0.055 
Horizontal_origin control No Yes No Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE No No Yes Yes 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at industry level.   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Horizontal_origin includes Horizontal_EU, Horizontal_NorthAme, Horizontal_Asia (<80%) 
and Horizontal_Asia (>80%).    
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shows consistent and signicant results. Also the coecient is larger than that of the spillover
index induced by the \>80%" group. This reveals that it is the Asian investors that are
endowed with relatively lower TFP level, have the most spillover eect on their upstream
Vietnamese suppliers.
5.2 Result for using both 35% and 80% TFP cutos
When we decompose the \<80%" group by adding the 35% TFP cuto, the result is even
more explicit. As can be seen in Table 2, among the three groups, i.e. low, middle and high-
TFP Asian investors, only the ones within middle TFP range (35%-80%) induce the most
positive and signicant vertical spillover. In the meantime, Asian investors within low TFP
range (<35%) have a negative impact on Vietnamese suppliers' TFP. The explanation for
this is that since Asian investors that have the most similar technology as local rms do are
likely to purchase the same parts that local rms will also use. Under certain circumstance,
it is dicult for the spillover to occur, and on the contrary, these Asian investors will pose
as a \threat" to their local suppliers and thus suppress the TFP growth of the latter.
5.3 Robustness checks
Several issues are worth extra care to conrm the robustness of our ndings. One might
argue that the dierence of spillover impact is due to geographical heterogeneity. For in-
stance, Vietnam has close business connection with Japan and China, and such special bond
will enhance the interaction between investors from these countries and local suppliers. But
it is not the case for investors from other Asian regions. If the distribution of Asian investors
within 35%-80% range is not random, then it will contaminate our estimation of technology
gap's sole inuence on the vertical spillover.
To alleviate this concern, we give the list of Asian investors in the \middle" subgroup. As
shown in Table 4, investors with middle-level TFP are not limited to a particular country,
rather, they are scattered, ranging from East Asia to South Asia. This gives us the reason
15
Table 2: Baseline grouping (35% and 80% TFP cutos)
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Stochastic  Frontier 
Dependent Variable LnTFP LnTFP LnTFP LnTFP 
Horizontal_total (lag 1) -0.0445***   -0.0104   
  (0.00832)   (0.00767)   
Vertical_Asia (lag 1) (<35%) -0.375** -0.486*** -0.373** -0.386** 
  (0.145) (0.149) (0.150) (0.152) 
Vertical_Asia (lag 1) (35~80%) 0.0486*** 0.0471*** 0.0278** 0.0276** 
  (0.0139) (0.0135) (0.0118) (0.0119) 
Vertical_Asia (lag 1) (>80%) 0.00528 0.00886* -0.0111 -0.0123 
  (0.00501) (0.00534) (0.0190) (0.0194) 
Vertical_Europe (lag1) -0.160* -0.115 0.0109 0.00443 
  (0.0881) (0.0849) (0.103) (0.100) 
Vertical_NorthAme (lag1) 0.567* 0.525 0.0913 0.101 
  (0.330) (0.325) (0.325) (0.333) 
Own_effort -3.69e-05*** -3.71e-05*** 5.78e-06 5.56e-06 
  (5.91e-06) (6.11e-06) (6.36e-06) (6.30e-06) 
Herfindal Index -0.176*** -0.0975* -0.0208 -0.0156 
  (0.0573) (0.0553) (0.0576) (0.0721) 
Observations 421,450 420,822 421,428 420,801 
R-squared 0.043 0.044 0.054 0.054 
Horizontal_origin control No Yes No Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE No No Yes Yes 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at industry level.   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Horizontal_origin includes Horizontal_EU, Horizontal_NorthAme, Horizontal_Asia (<35%), 
Horizontal_Asia (35%~80%) and Horizontal_Asia (>80%).    
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to believe that geographical (or cultural) dierence might not be as serious as we have
considered, though further eort is needed to justify this point.
Another issue is that the ownership of the foreign investors can aect the spillover they
induce to domestic rms, since joint ventures may face lower costs of nding local suppliers of
intermediates and thus be more likely to engage in local sourcing than wholly owned foreign
subsidiaries (Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2008). We thus generate the new vertical spillover
indexes based on the foreign investor's ownership (fully or partially owned) and include them
in equation (6). The estimation results remain unchanged17.
Also there might be concern on the measurement error of the TFP cutos. To conrm
this, we use 25% or 50% TFP cuto to replace 35% when dividing the <80% group. We
still come up with the same result regardless of which cuto value we use. It is the Asian
investors with middle-level TFP that induce the most signicant vertical spillover to their
Vietnamese suppliers.
To sum up, we can nd a nonlinear correlation between the technology level that Asian
investors own and the vertical spillover they might have on the local suppliers, which can be
depicted in Figure 4. The horizontal axis indicates the average TFP level of Asian investors
(or shown as percentile) and the vertical axis reveals the induced vertical spillover. The
vertical spillover keeps increasing but insignicant until ' reaches point a. Before ' reaches
b the vertical spillover will be signicant or even be maximized in some point above the line
\L". Taking into account the fact that most Asian investors have a higher average TFP level
than Vietnamese suppliers do, we can describe the relationship between the technology gap
(for Asian investors and Vietnamese suppliers) and the vertical spillover as an inverted-U
shape.
17We do not include the results due to space constraint, but they are available upon request.
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Table 3: List of Asian investors (between 35% and 80% TFP cuto)
Countryname Countrycode  Number of firms Percent (%) 
Taiwan 1320 5,306 34.33 
Korea, Republic 1311 3,106 20.1 
Japan 1307 2,906 18.8 
Singapore 1108 1,218 7.88 
China 1304 1,009 6.53 
Hongkong 1305 647 4.19 
Malaysia 1105 591 3.82 
Thailand 1109 384 2.48 
Philippine 1107 90 0.58 
Indonesia 1103 47 0.3 
India 1306 41 0.27 
Brunei 1101 22 0.14 
Israel 1204 21 0.14 
Bangladesh 1302 14 0.09 
Sri Lanka 1318 13 0.08 
 Total 15,415  
Source: General Statistics Office, Vietnam.  
18
Figure 4: Concept of implication.
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6 Conclusions
By far the spillover impact of FDI has been widely investigated. In this paper, we examine
how productivity gap and vertical spillover are correlated in the context of Vietnam. In
particular, we focus on Asian investors, which are most likely to induce vertical spillover
to local suppliers, as shown in the previous literature. After applying statistical method to
divide Asian investors by dierent TFP cutos, we show that the relationship between the
productivity gap and vertical spillover takes an inverted-U shape, i.e. Vietnamese suppliers
can achieve the most TFP gains from the diusion of the Asian investors with middle-level
TFP.
The empirical results are robust against several sensitivity checks, thus providing the
evidence that not all the foreign investors with the most advanced technology can bring
about the benets to the local economy. In some scenario, high-tech foreign investors might
want to protect their \core" competence and only outsource the minor components to the
local processing rms or suppliers. If that is the case, Vietnamese government should foster
Vietnamese rms to improve their technology level and adopt new policies to promote the
corporation between foreign investors and local rms.
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7 Appendix
TFP scores N mean sd max min
OLS 513913 0.001 0.004 1 0
SF 513913 0.513 0.165 0.81 0.008
LP 513913 0.028 0.046 1 0
Source:  Author’s own calculation based on Enterprise Survey,   
GSO, Vietnam
Table A1:  TFP comparison among different methods     
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